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ABSTRACT
Short-term interest rates in the United States have been "too high" since
October 1979 in the sense that both unconditional andconditionalforecasts, based
on an estimated vector autoregression model summarizing the prior experience,
underpredictshort-term interest rates during this period. Although a non-
structural model cannot directly answerthe question of why this has been so,
comparisonsof alternative conditional forecasts point to the post—October 1979
relationshipbetween the growth of real income and the growth of real money
balances as closely connected to the level and pattern of short—term interest
rates. This finding is consistent with the authors' earlier conclusion, based
onanalysis of a small structural Inacroeconometricmodel, that the high average
levelof interest rates has been due to a combination of slow growth of (nominal)
money supply and continuing price inflation, which together have kept real balances
small in relation to prevailing levels of economic activity.
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Just aboutall aspects ofinterest rates in the United States —including
theiroverall levels, their movements, and their relationships to one another —
havebeen extraordinary thus far during the 1980s. Observed nominal interest
rates on most instruments traded in the U.S. debt markets have set record
highs twice since 1980. The amplitude of interest rate swings over the economy's
one—and—a-half business cycles has also been unprecedented in U.S. experience,
andtheshorter-run volatility of interest rates (month-to-month, day-to—day,
oreven within the trading day) has increased dramatically. The term—structure
"yield curve" was sharply "inverted" during part of this time, although it is no
longer, and other yield comparisons (on taxable versus tax—exempt bonds, for
example) were and have remained far from theirhistorical norms.
The single aspect of interest rates that has attracted the most attention
during this period has been their persistently high level, including a presumed
high level of "real" interest rates —that is, observed nominal rates less
some presumed expectation of price inflation. During the past few years,
nominal interest rates first rose to levels far above the prevailing inflation
rate, andmorerecently the decline in nominal interest rates has lagged well
behind the slackening of the pace of inflation.
For two reasons the greatest attention, and also the greatest puzzlement,
have focused on the high level of short-terminterestrates. First, because
inferring market participants' expectations of inflation is typically more
difficult as the relevant time horizon is longer, the judgment that interest
rates have been unusuallyhighin real terms has been much safer for short than
for long maturities. Given the state of and prospects for business activity,
the normal cyclical slowing of inflation since 1980wasprobably widely—2—
anticipated. By contrast, who is prepared to say what market participants
thought (or think) about the outlook for inflation over the life of a thirty-
year bond?
Second, many of the familiar hypotheses advanced to explain the presund
high real interest rate levels have made sense only for longer maturities.
Fearthat the Federal Reserve System would abandon its anti-inflationary monetary
policy, for example, may haveaffected expectations about the likely rate of
inflationin subsequent years, but not over three-month horizons. Why,then,
would three-month interest rates have reflected it? The concern that the Reagan
Administration's fiscal policy, combining massive tax cuts with rapidly
increasingmilitary spending, would require high enough real interest rates to
"crowd out" large amounts of private investment is plausible enough —butonly
after the economy had recovered from the 1981-82 recession, which involved the
excess private saving also usually associated with weak economic activity.
This concern would not have affected short-term yields either, at least during
the period to 1983. The idea that increased interest rate and asset price
volatility in the financial markets has led to higher risk premia is quite
plausible too, but it again applies only to 1ongterm instruments, subject to
substantial capital risk. If anything, the effect of greater volatility should
be to increase the demand for short—term instruments, and hence to reduce the i
yields.
Nevertheless,U.S. short-term interest rates certainly have been high in
the recent past, in both nominal and real terms. From 1953 through the third
quarter of 1979 —afamiliar break point in recent analysis of U.S. monetary
policy —the average discount on three-month U.S. Treasury bills was 5.27%.
Thesubsequent average (to midyear 1983)has been 11.67%. For the corresponding
realrate, representing the difference between this nominal rate and the—3—
annualized percentage change in the gross national product deflator, the analogous
comparison is 1.39% versus 4.71%. During the earlier twenty-six years the
maximum nominal rate observed in any quarter was 9.06% (in 1979:3), while the
maximum real rate was 3.24% (in 1953:4) —inboth cases below the corresponding
recent means. Since October 1979, the nominal rate in every quarter but one has
been at least 6% above the corresponding 195 3-79 mean. With few exceptions, the
real rate since then has also consistently been well above the corresponding
1953—79 mean.
In an earlier paper, the authors (1983) used a small structural econometric
model to address two questions: Have U.S. short-term interest rates been "too
high,"given the relevanthistorical relationships connecting interest rates and
other key aspects of macroeconomic activity? nd if so, then why? The basic
strategy employed in that paper was to analyze the errors made in forecasting
short—term interest rates for 1979:4-1983:2, using a model estimated with data
through 1979:3, and to compare them with the analogous errors made for 1976:3-
1979;3 using the same model estimated only with data through 1976:2.1 The
conclusionsof thatanalysis were that U.S. short—term interest rates since
October1979 have indeed been "toohigh"in a meaningful sense, and that the
familiar story of too little money for the prevailinglevels of economic activity
—inparticulars the small growth of real balances due to the combination of
slow growth of nominal moneysupply and sluggish deceleration of price inflation
largelyaccounts for this phenomenon.
The objectof this paper is to re-examine the same questions using a
differentset of empirical tools •Astructural model like that used in the
authors' earlier paper imposes potentially important restrictions othewayin
whichtheestimated model summarizes the relationships exhibited byprior
expeience1ny analysisbased on a structural model is therefore conditional—4-
on those restrictions. Restrictions that are ylid reflections of actual
economicbehavior will enable the model to extract the relevant behavioral
relationships moreefficiently from the available data, but incorrect or
arbitrary restrictions will distort the representation of these relationships.
2nalternative enirical strategy, developed primarily by Sims (1980a, 1980b,
1982), is to forego structural restrictions altogether —that is, apart from
the choice of the variables to be included in the analysis —andinstead to
irk with unrestricted dynamic representations of the data.
The exercisereported in this paper uses a small vector autoregression
representation of the relationships among key macroeconomic variables in the
United States to study the same1979:4—1983:2behavior of short-term interest
rates examined in the authors' earlier paper. Here again, the ability to forecast
interest rates during this period, using a model estimated with data ending in
1979:3, sheds light on the question of whether rates have been "too high." To
anticipate, the answer is again yes. Without a structural model, the analysis
cannot directly address the question of why this has been so. Nevertheless,
further experiments based on a conditional forecasting technique suggested by
Doan et al. (1983) indicate results consistent with the authors' earlier finding
that the scarcity of real balances in relation to prevailing levels of economic
activity has been an inportant element in the U.S. interest rate experience since
October 1979. In short, the results of the vector autoregression analysis
reported here correspond well with the main conclusions based on the structural
model.
Section I summarizes the vector autoregression model and presents the
model's (unconditional) forecast of U.S. short—term interest rates during 1979:4-
19832. Section II briefly describes the conditional forecasting technique and
presents results indicating that no single variable —neithermoney, the
government deficit, nor any of the other variables included in the analysis—5—
is sufficient to account for the experience of short-term interest rates during
this period.Sections III and IV present further conditional forecasting
results, including especially those involving the relationship between real
money balances and real economic activity. Section V briefly summarizes the
paper's principal conclusions.
I.The Vector Autoregressive Model andItsUnconditional Projections
The analysis below uses a constant—coefficient, linear vector autoregression
modelto estimate the pre-October 1979 probability structure ofthe quarterly
data for six key U.S. macroeconomic variables: the growth rate of the narrowly
defined money stock (Ml), the growth rate of total nonfinancial credit, the change
in the federal budget deficit, the growth rate of real gross national product,
therate of change of the grOss national product deflator, and the change in




where z isthe vector of six variables specificabove, a is a vector ofconstants,
the B(s) are time—invariantmatricesof autoregression coefficients, andis
a vector ofindependent and identically distributed innovations. Table I reports
theresults of estimating this system for quarterly data spanning 1962:3-1979:3.
Over the sample, money growth "Granger—caused" short—term interest rate changes,
but not real income growth. By contrast, both credit growth and interest rate
changesdid"Granger—cause" real income growth.3 correlations among the in-
sample innovations (not shown in the table) indicatethat the surprises in income
growthand ininterest rates were positively correlated, while surprisesin
money growth and in inflation wereboth negatively correlated with interest rate
surprises.—6—
Given the dynamic correlations among the macroeconomic variables
summarized by the estimated vector autoregression, it is straightforward to
construct a post—October 1979 path that is most likely, in the absence of
further information, for any of the model's variables. In particular, obtaining
the best linear projection of the post-sample values attained by the variables
in each of the fifteen quarters 1979:4-1983:2 simply requires recursively
forecasting one step ahead at a time with the autoregressive equations,
using the successively forecast values of the variables as the data of the system.
Coluinn (1) and (2) of Table II conare this projection for the short—
term interest rate with the corresponding actual values. The forecast fails
to capture any of the variation in short—term interest rates that has attracted
so much attention during this period. The mean error of —.62% —thatis, an
underprediction of short—term interest rates on average —resultsfrom a larger
underprediction during 1980 and 1981 combined with a substantial overprediction
in late 1982 and 1983. The root-mean-square error is 2.38%.
nalogouscomparisonsfor the system' s other fivevariables,shown in
summary formin Table III confirm several familiar conjectures about the post—
October 1979 macroeconomic experience. Over the twelvequarters 1979:4—1982:3,
forexample, money growth was consistently slower (while the short—term interest
ratewas consistently higher) than projected. For the seven quarters 1981:4-
1983:2, both income growth and inflation were also consistently slower than
projected. Nonetheless, money growth was substantially faster (and the interest
rate lower) than projected for the more recent quarters 1982:4—1983:2. For the
eight quarters immediately following October 1979, both income growth and
inflation were roughly as projected by the model.—7—
II. Conditional Forecasting with the Vector Autoregression Model
The next step of the analysis is to construct and study the best linear
projections of one element of z (the short-term interest rate) givenknowledge
of the history of zup toOctober 1979and inaddition knowledge of various
(linearcombinations of) elements of z during the post-October 1979 period being
forecast. In other words, the object is to construct forecasts of the short-
term interest rate in each post-October 1979 quarter that will incorporate
knowledge of (linear combinations of) other elements of z in all post-October
1979 quarters through the end of the forecast period. Recent work by Sims (1982)
andDoanet al. (1983) has introduced and successfullyemployed such conditional
projectionsto evaluate the plausibility of macroeconometric forecasts in light
ofthe historical dynamic correlations among the variables being predicted.
The basis for constructing these constrained projections is the method of
Kalman filtering. Clarida and Coyle (1983) have shown that Kalman filtering may
beapplied to any state space model which. combines post—sample observations on a
linear combination of a system's variables with that system's historically
estimated parameters to yield minimum mean—square linear estimates which
optimally incorporate the post-'sample observations. They have also established
a particularly simple relationship between the unconditional projection of z
in the s'th post-sample quarter, say, andthe projection Iwhich
incorporates a vector of post-sample observations, ,onlinear combinations of
the elements of z:
l=+ K(-?).
In words, the difference between the ôonditional and unconditional projection
for z is then just a linear transformation of the difference between the
observed vectorand its best linear projection .Theassociated transformation—8—
matrix K canbecomputed directly, and at reasonable cost, from the parameter
and variance—covariance matrices of the estimated vector autoregression.
Columns (3)-(7) of Table II show the results of using the model described
in Section I to generate successive dynamic forecasts of U.S. short—term interest
rates that are each conditional on one variable among the five (other than the
interest rate itself) included in the vector autoregression system. For each
successive conditioning variable, the relevant column reports the fifteen
quarter-by—quarter forecast values, together with the same summarystatistics
shown in column (2) for the unconditional forecast.
What is immediately striking in this set of results is that, with the
single exception of the forecast conditional on the price variable, none of
these conditionalforecasts represents animprovement over the unconditional
forecastdiscussedin Section I. The forecast conditional on money growth is by
fartheworst among the five, as the model not only fails tQ capture much of
the movement to unusually high short-term interest rates in 1980 and1981but
also incorrectly infers that the speed-up of money growth in 1982 andearly
1983 would have led rates to drop to levels last seen in the l950s. Boththe
root—mean—square error and the mean absolute error are much larger than those of
theunconditional forecast. The forecast conditional on credit growth is
roughlysimilar overall, although less extremely off track than that conditional
on money growth. At least in this context, knowing either money growth (only)
or credit growth (only) would have been less useful than knowing nothing at all.
Theforecastconditional on the deficit change captures the high average
short-terminterest rate level in 1980 and 1981 with fair accuracy —exceptfor
the immediate post-credit-controls (and post-recession) dip in 1980:3, of.
course —butit fails to capture the sharp drop in rates that occurred once the
stance of monetary policy shifted in late 1982. As a result, this forecast—9--
overpredicts short—term interest rates on average during 1979 :3—1983 :2, in
contrastto the average underprediction made by the unconditional forecast
or the forecast conditional on either money or credit growth. The meanerror
here is somewhat smaller (in absolute value) than that of the unconditional
forecast, but the root—mean-square error is larger.
Although the summary statistics for the forecast conditional on real
income growth and that conditional on the deficit change are almostidentical,
the quarter-by—quarter forecast values show large dissimilarities.The forecast
conditionalon real growth underpredicts short—term interest rates onaverage in
1980 and 1981, but then entirely misses the sharp drop thataccompanied the end
of the 1981-82 recession and the beginning of the businessrecovery. The overall
result is again overprediction (by the smallest mean absoluteerror among the
fiveforecastsconsidered here), and again a root-mean-square error evenlarger
than that of the unconditional forecast.
Theforecastconditional on price inflation is the only one among the five
to improve unambiguously on the unconditional forecast. Thequarter-by—quarter
pattern of this forecast is similar to that of the forecast conditionalon the
deficit change. The forecast conditional on inflation alsocaptures reasonably
well the high average level of short-term interest rates in 1980and 1981 (again,
exceptfor 1980:3), and it also fails to capture the drop in rates at the end
of 1982. Its mean overprediction is somewhat larger than that of theforecast
conditional on the deficit change (it is almost as largeas the mean absolute
error of the unconditional forecast), but the associatedroot-mean—square error
issmaller than that of any of the other forecasts considered thus far.
On the whole, these dynamic interest rate forecasts conditionalon single
othervariables are not encouraging, They suggest that (with the limitedpossible
exception of inflation) no one macroeconomic variable can tell much of thestory—10—
ofwhy short-term interest rates moved as they did during this period.
III. Richer Conditional Forecasts: The Role of Real Balances
As the discussion in Section II explains, the conditional forecasting
technique suggested by Doan et al. facilitates using an estimated vector
autoregression model not only to generate forecasts conditional on one single
variable but also forecasts conditional on several variables or on the sums or
differences (more generally, any linear combination) of several variables.
In light of the limited success of the short—term interest rate forecasts
conditional only on single variables, it is worthwhile to experiment with forecasts
conditional on richer information sets. Even so, simply trying in succession all
possible combinations among the five other variables included in the vector
autoregression hardly makes sense. The approach taken here is instead to
focus on a few specific combinations suggested by the authors' previous work,
based on a structural model, which concluded that the high level of U.S. short-
term interest rates since October 1979 has principally reflected the relationship
between real money balances and real economic activity.
Column (3) of Table II already indicates the limited value, from the
perspective of the vector autoregression's forecast of short-term interest
rates during this period, of the information contained in the growth rate of real
incon. Column (8) shows a similar result for the growth rate of real money
balances, represented in the modelby the difference between the (nominal) money
growthrate variable and the price inflation variable. The forecast conditional
on real money growth underpredicts short—term interest rates, although with a
small mean absolute error. Its root—mean—square error, however, is larger than
that of the unconditional forecast, In short, neither real income growth nor real
money growth (and certainly not nominal money growth) successfully helps the model—11—
topredict short-term interest rates during this period.
Bycontrast, the two together do justthat.Column (9)shows the results
ofa forecastof short—term interest rates conditional on both real incomegrowth
and real money growth. This forecast underpredicts part of the highaverage
interestrate level in1980 and 1981,anditdoes not adequately capture the
decline in late 1982. On balance it underpredicts short-term interestrates, with
a mean absolute error less than half that of the unconditional forecast. More
importantly,the root—mean-square error is substantially smaller than that of the
unconditional forecast (and also smaller than thatof the forecast conditional
on the inflation rate).
Thisresult, like any finding based on a non-structural model, cannot by
itself lead to any conclusions about what has "causedt' the high interestrate
levels prevailing in the United States since October 1979. It simply relates
interest rates to specific macroeconomic variables —inparticular, real balances
and real incomeand not to elements of macroeconomic behavior likemoney demand
and money supply. Nevertheless, the apparent value in this context of the
information contained jointly in real money growth and real incomegrowth is
consistent with the authors' earlier explanation (based on a structural model)
that the slow growth of nominal money supply and the continuing rapid price
inflation combined to render the supply of real money balances small incomparison
withthe real money demand associated with the prevailing levels of real activity..4
To put the point the other way around, the. alternative findingthat real money
growthand real income growth jointly contained little information thathelped
the model to forecast short—term interest rates would have cast doubton the
authors'earlier explanation. Insteadof such a negative result, however, the
oppositeis a better description.
Given this result, it is interesting to determine whether the information—12—
that matters for the model's forecast of short—term interest rates involves
real income growth and real money growth separately, or only their difference
—that is, the growth of velocity. An analogous forecast conditional on
velocity growth (not shown in the table) results in a mean error of .37% and a
root—mean—square error of 2.09%, inferior to the forecast conditional on real
income growth and real money growth separately, but superior to any of the
other forecasts considered.5 In other words, imposing the restriction
represented by combining real income growth. and real money growth into velocity
growth causes a loss of some, but far from all, of the relevant information
contained in these two variables.
Before drawing anyfirm conclusionson the basis of the superior
performanceof the short—term interest rate forecast conditional on real income
growth and real money growth (or, to a lesser extent, the forecast conditional
on velocity growth), itisuseful tolearnwhether the same relative success is
alsoassociated with forecasts conditional on other combinations of variables.
Once again, simply trying all possiblecombinations ofconditioning variables
makeslittlesense. Nevertheless, two further projections of the short—term
interestrate (not shown in the table) eaôh conditional on an information set
intuitivelycorresponding to familiar discussions about recent interest rate
levels—realincome growth and real credit growth, and (nominal) money growth
and the deficit change .—generateresults that are less satisfactory than even
the unconditional projection shown in column (2).
The relationship between the growth of real income and the growth of real
balancesdoesstand outf therefore, as apparently bearing a close connection to
therecent experience of short—term interest rates. The information contained
in these variables improves the model's short—term interest rate forecast in
comparison to the corresponding unconditional forecast, in comparison to forecasts—1 3—
conditional on single variables (including real income growth or real money
growth separately), and in comparison to forecasts conditional on other
combinations of variables.
IV. Forecasts Conditional on the Full Information Set
Theresultspresentedin Sections II and III focus on projections of the
most likely post.-October 1979 path for U.S. short-term interest rates which
incorporateinformation about various other aspects of the contemporaneous
macroeconomic experience. The results indicate that the unprecedented behavior
of short—term rates throughout this period is consistent with some features of
the recent macroeconomic experience (for exanle, the relationship between real
balances and real income), but not with others (for example, the respective
pathsof money andthedeficit). Column(10)of Table II shows the projection
ofthe most likely recent short-term interest rate path which simultaneously
incorporates information on the post-October 1979 behavior of all five of the
system's other variables: money growth,credit growth, real income growth, price
inflation, and the deficit change.
Giventhe recent behavior and historical correlations among all of these
key macroeconomic variables,the resulting projection substantially and
consistently underpredicts short-term interest rates throughout the period since
October 1979. The mean error is -2.74%, with underpredctions in eleven of the
fifteen quarters,(The only exceptions are 1980:3 and 1982:4-l983;2 episodes
alreadyhighlighted above.) This "fully informed" projection does forecast short-
terminterest ratesthat are quite high in relation to historical experience,
witha forecast mean of 8.92% versus comparable averages of 6.12% during the
l970sand 3.45% from the end of the Korean War through the l96Os. Nevertheless,
the iulications of the "fully inorined" projection exercise is clear. The-14-
behavior of short—term interest rates since October 1979 does not appear to be
consistent with the relevant historical correlations and the recent macroeconomic
experience.
V. Summary of Conclusions
Two questions motivated the analysis in this paper: Have U.S. short-
term interest rates been "too high," given the relevant historical relationships
connecting interest rates and other key aspects of macroeconomic activity? And
if so, then why?
Theanalysis here gives a yes answer to the first question. An estimated
model summarizing the prior experience predicts that short-term interest rates
would behigh on average after October 1979, but not so high as the average
level actually obtained. The model's unconditional forecast underpredicts
interest rates in the post—October 1979 period, and so does the corresponding
forecast conditional on all fiveofthe other variables included.
A non—structural model cannot directly answer the second question, but
comparisons among the conditional forecasting exercises reported here point to the
post-October 1979 relationship between the growth of real income and the growth
ofreal money balances as closely connected to the pattern of short—term interest
rates during this period. This finding is consistent with the authors' earlier
conclusion,based onanalysis of a small structural macroeconometric model,
thatthe high average level ofinterest rates has been due to a combination of
slow growth of(nominal) money supply and continuing price inflation, which
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1. The cut-off at 1976 :2 represented the end of the sample used in the original
presentation of the model in Friedman (1977).
2. The interest rate data are averages of daily observations for the first month
of each quarter. The inflation data are contemporaneous with the interest
rate data. Alternative ways of constructing the data —forexample,
aligning the interest rate and price change series differently or using
quarterly average interest rate observations —apparentlymake little
difference for the results reported here.
3. The "Granger causality from interest rates to output has been documented by
Sims (1980b). "Granger causality" from credit to output is consistent with
the findings of Friedman (1983).
4. The same storycanbe told in either real or nominal terms, of course,
althoughthereal version is presumably preferable unless the income
elasticity of the demand for money is identical to the price elasticity. A
forecast analogous to that reported in column (9), but conditional or
nominal money and nominal income, results in mean error 1.19% and root—mean—
square error 2,01%.
5. The root—mean—square error matches that of the forecast conditional on price
inflation, but the mean error is smaller.References
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